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Abstract—Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial
examples, which poses an indisputable threat to their applica-
tions. However, recent studies observe gradient-masking defenses
are self-deceiving methods if an attacker can realize this defense.
In this paper, we propose a new defense method based on
appending information. We introduce the Aux Block model
to produce extra outputs as a self-ensemble algorithm and
analytically investigate the robustness mechanism of Aux Block.
We have empirically studied the efficiency of our method against
adversarial examples in two types of white-box attacks, and
found that even in the full white-box attack where an adversary
can craft malicious examples from defense models, our method
has a more robust performance of about 54.6% precision on
Cifar10 dataset and 38.7% precision on Mini-Imagenet dataset.
Another advantage of our method is that it is able to maintain the
prediction accuracy of the classification model on clean images,
and thereby exhibits its high potential in practical applications.
Index Terms—adversarial example, defense method, white-box
attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Breakthroughs in deep neural networks (DNN) learning
have achieved exceptional performance across a wide range
of applications, such as in image classification [11] and in
speech recognition [9]. However, recent studies showed that
neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, and
attackers can design maliciously perturbed inputs to mislead
a model at the test phase [2], [12], [20]. Furthermore, these
inputs can transfer across different models, and one example
can attack several models without knowing model structures
or parameters [20]. This threats DNN applications in security-
sensitive systems such as in self-driving cars and in identity
authentication.
Specifically, the phenomenon of adversarial examples has
inspired researchers to defense adversarial examples as a
defender; meanwhile others play the part in attackers to design
threatening attacks with slight perturbations. For example, a
natural image x is correctly classified by a machine learning
model, while an adversarial example x′ is similar to x but has
been predicted as belonging to a different category. To produce
such an x′, an algorithm can be designed by minimizing the
perturbation and making adversarial samples imperceptible to
a human (ref. Fig. 1).
Adversarial examples are constructed to mislead the pre-
dicted output. To tackle the problem, a natural idea is to output
multiple results instead of one. In this paper, we follow this
The work is partially supported by Project No. xxxxxx.
idea and introduce the Aux Block model. In our model, a
new block expands the original model; and we propose several
Aux Blocks, which is like a self-ensemble model (ref. Fig. 2).
We propose applicable Aux Block structures and show that
Aux Block improves the network robustness against white-box
attacks. Additionally, we cogitate the full white-box attacks
(called as adaptive white-box attack), with which an adversary
knows defense details thoroughly. Our algorithm can still work
against the irresistible adversarial examples.
Specifically in our work, we have made the following
contributions:
1) We propose a novel information-appending defense
method for improving the robustness of neural networks
to perturbation. The key idea is to affix Aux Blocks in
some convolution layers. This algorithm can be regarded
as building a self-ensemble model.
2) We propose two Aux Block algorithms: a basic one and
a score-based one. We show empirically that Aux Blocks
could improve the robustness of model against static
white-box attacks compared to the adversarial training
model.
3) We investigate the method’s appearances in adaptive
white-box attacks. Our method still has a robust per-
formance even when facing with the Adp-FGSM attack
to bypass defenses.
The motivation of our method is straightforward and intu-
itive. In practice, the method can be easily implemented and
applied in different scenarios. To evaluate the performance of
the proposed models, we have carried out a variety of experi-
ments. Simple as it is, our approach has reported significantly
improved results over a number state-of-the-art solutions,
and therefore exhibited its high potential as a practical and
effective solution to real problems.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the background and related work. Section 3 presents our
model. Section 4 reports our experimental results, followed
by conclusions and discussions in Section 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Networks
For a clean image x, denote by f (·) a neural network, and
y the class label. The feature vector f i−1 is an input of the i-
th layer for a feed-forward network. Activation functions such
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Fig. 1. Set of legitimate and adversarial samples from MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets: For each dataset, legitimate samples, which are correctly classified by
DNNs, are found on the top row. Adversarial samples, which are misclassified by DNNs, are on the bottom row.
as ReLU [16] mix in some layers to make model non-linear.
Thus the i-th layer computes:
f i(x) = ReLU(wif i−1(x) + bi),
where wi is a matrix and bi is a vector. In the final layer, the
predicted probability of yi is p(yi|x) and the predicted class
is given by
y = arg max
i
p(yi|x).
The loss function of a classifier for input x and target y is
J (x, y).
B. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples [20] are inputs crafted by attackers to
mislead machine learning models. The malicious input x′ =
x+ σ and σ is a slightly perturbation with ‖σ‖ < , where 
is so small that it makes no visual difference between x and
x′ for human being but deep neural networks will be fooled
such that f (x′) 6= ytrue.
Most attacks use Lp-norm distance matrix to define the
magnitude of σ, i.e.: L0, the number of permuted pixels [17];
L2, the Euclidean distance between x and x′ [6], [15], [20];
L∞, a measure of the maximum absolute change in any pixel
[12]. A permuted image will be similar to clean image visually
if any of three distance metrics is small.
Szegedy [20] first proposed to find adversarial examples in
DNN models, he used L-BFGS algorithm to find them and
observed that they catastrophically destroyed DNN models.
They also observed that the transferability property of adver-
sarial perturbations, one generated from an arbitrary model
can also fool other models to produce incorrect outputs even if
they are trained on different datasets with completely different
structures. This phenomenon makes black-box attacks feasible.
Next, we discuss several attacking methods in our experi-
ments.
Fast Gradient Sign Method: FGSM
Goodfellow er al. [7] proposed the FGSM method for
crafting adversarial examples. FGSM is un-targeted and uses
the same attack strength at every dimension:
xFGSM = x+  sign(∇xJ(x, y))
The above equation increases the loss function J(·) by adding
a transformed gradient to input x, where  is small enough to
be undetectable.
There are several variants such as R+FGSM [21], BIM [12],
and so on.
Projected Gradient Descent:PGD
Madry et al. [14] reviewed adversarial robustness in a max-
min saddle point problem and suggested that BIM (Basic
Iterative Method applies FGSM multiple times with small step
size) [12] is a projected gradient descent method essentially.
In the following sections, we will replace BIM by PGD.
They conjectured that Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) is
the strongest attack utilizing the local first order information
about the network [14].
xN+1 = Πx+S(xN + α(∇xJ(x, y)))
where α controls the magnitude of the perturbation in each
iteration.
Carlini and Wagner’s Attacks
Carlini and Wagner proposed a high success rate method
– optimization-based attack algorithms [6] to craft adversarial
with low distortion. There are three versions based on different
measures: L2, L0 and L∞. However, Carlini and Wagner’s
attack is computationally expensive compared to FGSM. In
our paper, we select Carlini and Wagner’s L2 attack.
Boundary Attacks
Wieland et al. [3] introduced a decision-based attack which
dose not rely on gradient of the model but the final decision
boundary of the model. A random perturbation are crafted at
first, reduced iteratively in the adversarial region. We will use
this algorithm as a gradient-free attack.
Fig. 2. (Left) Blue dotted circular frame is the private of an original model, while green dotted frame is the private of Aux Blocks, an Aux Block can be
any function.(right) An example of an Aux Block, an one hidden layer CNN.
C. Defenses Methods
Adversarial Training is one of the most popular defense
strategies, which is to train a model using both clean data and
adversarial data [7], [20] to improve robustness. We study the
adversarial training algorithm in [14] which solves a min-max
problem:
θ∗ = arg min
θ
E
x,y∈X
[
max
σ∈[−,]N
J(x+ σ, y)
]
.
The authors solved the inner problem by crafting adversarial
examples with projected gradient descent attacks.
Previous work has observed the phenomenon of gradient
masking [1], which refers to a defense model with useless
gradients by proposing a non-differentiable model [4] or
representing data with less details [24]. Some defenses such as
BRELU and MagNet are experimentally defeated with a small
distortion [5]. Defensive Distillation [18] is also one of the
most famous attack-agnostic techniques, which aims to make
NN models more robust against all attacks but this method is
not robust under Carlini and Wagner’s attack [6]. Moreover,
most defenses obfuscate gradients somewhat, which indicate
that the adversarial attack is still an unsolved problem and
open for study.
D. Threat Model
In our setting, we assume that an attacker have all knowl-
edge of a model, such as the model parameters and model
architectures in white-box attacks. Moreover, we introduce a
clever attacker who is assumed to be aware of defenses that
may be used.
As in Warren et al. [8], we consider two white-box attacks
(ref. Table I):
Static Adversary
Attackers know everything about the model itself but do not
realize any protection defense. A static Adversary is called
partial white-box attacks in adversarial machine learning.
Adaptive Adversary
An adversarial examples are crafted and tailored for specific
defenses by attackers. This is more difficult to resist compared
with static adversary. In this paper, we consider both static and
adaptive adversaries.
TABLE I
THREAT MODEL: ADVERSARY KNOWS θoriginal AND/OR θdefense
θoriginal θdefense
Black-box attack unknown unknown
Static attack known unknown
Adaptive attack known known
III. METHOD
In this section, we illustrate our Aux Block model to im-
prove neural network’s robustness. We will first introduce our
algorithm and motivations, and then discuss some observations
behind our algorithm.
Ensemble of several different models can improve robust-
ness against malicious inputs. However, the straits of con-
ventional ensemble methods are also apparent: storing and
reloading k different models is a huge burden on memory
consumption, and tuning parameters in each model is a tricky
task. In this paper, we propose an algorithm that is able
to generate several auxiliary classifiers in one model with
less memory cost and can avoid additional parameter tuning
process.
A. Model
Our main idea is to introduce Aux Block and then divide the
model into two versions: a public model and a private model.
More specifically, the public model is a standard convolutional
neural network and the private is several branching auxiliary
models as shown in Fig. 2. The public model can be revealed
to attackers while the private model is confidential to them,
so malicious hackers cannot create valid examples easily. An
aux Block can be any structure, and in this paper we propose
a tiny neural network.
Fig. 3. The first row shows the adp-inputs in the non-defense model, adversarial training model and our model on Mini-Imagenet dataset. The second row
shows the perturbation images from Adp-PGD attacks in the three models.
Algorithm 1 Training and Testing of Aux Block
Require: m Aux Blocks as fA1 , fA2 , · · · , fAm and an origi-
nal CNN model as f .
Training Phase:
for i = 1, 2, · · · do
Randomly sample (xi, yi) in dataset
Compute loss =
m∑
j=1
l(fAj (xi), yi) + l(f(xi), yi)
Compute ∆w = ∇wloss
Update w ← w −∆w
end for
Testing Phase:
A testing image x
for j = 1, 2, · · · ,m+ 1 do
Calculate probability output of each Aux Block and the
original model:
pj = fAj (x), if j < m+1 or pj = f(x), if j = m+1
Calculate each output yj = arg maxk pk
end for
Predict the class:
for each label k = 1, 2, · · · , n do
Yk =
m+1∑
j=1
1,if yj = k
end for
Predict the class yˆ,with yˆ = arg maxk Yk.
Auxiliary network architectures are well-designed for sev-
eral different datasets in the context of image classification.
Details about the architectures will be discussed concretely
in the next section. We denote an integral model as f , x is
the input image, and the output is an n-dimensional vector
instead of a single value: y = [y1, y2, y3, . . . , ym+1], y in <m
(m is the number of Aux Blocks ), y1 is the output of the
public network, while y2, y3, . . . , ym+1 is from Aux Blocks.
Since the malevolent examples are crafted without auxiliary
information, predicted outputs are less likely to be misled in
Aux Blocks. Therefore our model can be deployed in security-
sensitive areas.
The new cross-entropy loss function is rewritten as:
Loss = −
n∑
i=1
αi(
T∑
j=1
yij · logPij),
where T is the number of class labels, yij denotes the value
of label j in classifier i and Pij is classifying possibility for
yij . Since the new loss function is an aggregation function
from each classifier, αi ∈ < is a parameter which controls the
relative weight of i classifier in the total loss, as the confidence
of an Aux Block in the final decision. In this paper, we use
α = 1 for all Aux Blocks.
Algorithm 2 A score-based Aux Block algorithm
Similar steps as Algorithm 1
Predict the class:
We have the Aux Block weight αi and the probability of
class k in Aux Block j as pjk.
for j = 1, 2, · · · ,m+ 1 do
Calculate softmax values from probability outputs in each
Aux Block sj = [ e
pj0
n∑
k=1
epjk
, e
pj1
n∑
k=1
epjk
, · · · , epjnn∑
k=1
epjk
].
end for
Sum up the probability of all Aux Blocks and the original
network s =
m+1∑
j=1
αisj .
Predict the class yˆ,with yˆ = arg max s.
Our algorithm is listed in Algorithm1. In the algorithm,
we select the class k which most Aux Blocks support as the
final output. There are also other measures, such as a score-
based algorithm with which the only difference is on selecting
the final output. In Algorithm 2, we implement the same
training phase but in the testing phase. We calculate values
of each class and select the maximum value. Compared with
Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 evaluates probability of each class
more discretely and considers that an Aux Block with larger
α has a large weight in testing. We apply Algorithm 1 when
αi = 1, (i = 1, · · · ,m). Algorithm 1 becomes equivalent to
Algorithm 2 .
B. Discussion
In the static adversary, adversarial examples are crafted
based on the non-defense model. So there can be two totally
different approaches to defense these attacks. One is to re-
duce some necessary information, with which some existing
defenses have used [23]. However, a defense performs well
in a static adversary may be stock in the gradient masking
phenomenon. Anish and Nicholas [1] observed that defending
models based on gradient obfuscation is a false orientation.
Instead of information-reducing algorithms, our method
increases the information by a combination output from all
Aux Blocks and the original network. We do not obfuscate
gradients in the original model, but an adversarial example
crafted from the original model are blind to the extra knowl-
edge in Aux Blocks.
In the adaptive adversary, masking gradient methods are
like self-deceived. When an attacker realizes the defense, he
or she can bypass the defense effortless then the defense has
no any effect for adversarial examples. We propose a new
attack Adp-FGSM to craft malicious examples from defense
models straight. Our method can still improve robustness in
this adversary. Though an attack crafts an adversarial image
for our approach, the perturbation aims to mislead one Aux
Block can be right classified by other Aux Blocks. We will
give more explanations about this in Section 4.4.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiments setups
1) Datasets: Our experiments are performed on three
datasets:
1) MNIST [13] contains 70,000 samples: 60,000 training
samples and 10,000 testing samples. Each sample is a
grayscale image with 28 × 28 pixels. The number of
possible classes is 10.
2) CIFAR10 [10] contains 60,000 images in 10 classes:
50,000 training images and 10,000 testing images with
32× 32 pixels in RGB color channels.
3) We also test on Mini-Imagenet dataset with 10 classes
randomly chosen from the 100 MiniImagenet classes
[22] (each class with 600 images), on which a VGG16
model has been trained on 5000 images (500 images in
each class) with 87.8 % top-1 accuracy.
We consider two convolutional neural networks: LeNet5
[13] and VGG16 [19]. The activation function in each network
is RELU and loss function is cross-entropy function.
2) Defense: Adversarial training (AT) with adversarial ex-
amples crafted by PGD attacks [14]. On the MNIST dataset,
we pre-train an AT model with the maximum perturbation
 = 0.2, step size α = 0.02, while on both CIFAR10 dataset
and Mini-Imagenet dataset,  is 8/255 and α = 2/255.
3) Attacking Methods: In the static white-box adversary,
we use the following attacks.
1) We implement PGD with 5 iterations: α = 0.1,  = 0.3
on MNIST ,α = 2/255,  = 8/255 on CIFAR10 and
α = 3/255,  = 10/255 on Mini-Imagenet.
2) We implement Carlini and Wagner’s L2 attack as a
targeted attack.
3) We implement Boundary attacks as a gradient-free at-
tack.
While in the adaptive adversarial, we use the adaptive attacks.
We modify FGSM and PGD to Adp-FGSM and Adp-PGD
for the adaptive adversary, xadv are crafted from:
xadv = xadp + (∇xadpJadp(xadp, y)),
where xadp and Jadp are re-designed on this particular defense.
Adversarial Training. We reassess that this algorithm trans-
forms the original inputs to adversarial inputs, therefore we use
the new input xadp = x + ∆x, where ∆x is the perturbation
for Adversarial Training.
Aux Block. We use the loss function defined in Section 3 to
fool all Aux Blocks and the original model together:
Jadp(x, y) =
m∑
j=1
l(fAj (x), y) + l(f(x), y).
Fig.3 shows the adversarial examples from Adp-PGD.
4) Implementation Details: The training hyper-parameters
for all models selected are in Table III. We use a SGD
optimizer during the training phase. Especially, we run pre-
trained models for 5 epochs to get adversarial training models.
B. Aux Block Details
In this section, We review VGG16 structures as [64,64,M,
128,128,M, 256 ,256, 256, M, 512, 512, 512, M, 512,512, 512,
M], one Aux Block model as Block.
The first question: Where is the suitable position of a Block?
The instinct is that features in high layers are easy to be
contaminated and a small perturbation in one pixel is an
accumulation of the large region, since features are more
abstract and the receptive field of one pixel is large. In our
experiment, we insert 3 Aux Blocks in three different position:
[64,64,’Block1’, M, 128,128, M, 256,’Block2’,256, 256, M,
512, 512, 512, M, 512,’Block3’,512, 512, M]. We craft our
Aux Block in Table IV.
Feature maps in each convolution layer are our inputs in an
Aux Block. Since the feature size shrinks after filtering each
maxpooling layer, we use a flexible Aux Block structure: the
number of our Aux Block layer decreases if the size of a
feature map diminishes.
As mentioned above, the three Aux Blocks have different
structures: Block1 is same as Aux Block in TableIV, while
Block2,Block3 is in TableV. Block3 only has a max pooling
layer since the feature size is 2× 2.
Fig. 4. The first row shows the accuracy curves of Adp-FGSM and Adp-PGD on MNIST dataset. The second row shows the curves on CIFAR10 dataset.
TABLE II
COMPARISONS OF ACCURACIES ON MNIST, CIFAR10 AND MINI-IMAGENET DATASETS,
Dataset Method Clean PGD CW Boundary
Attack
MNIST NA 98.88 21.26 0.0 0.2
Adversarial Training 98.76 89.63 58.2 97.9
Aux Block(all) 98.49 88.2 68.4 96.6
Aux Block(private) 98.21 89.59 76.8 97.7
CIFAR10 NA 92.53 12.30 0.0 5.4
Adversarial Training 83.89 78.82 76.7 83.5
Aux Block(all) 91.72 74.44 77.1 87.1
Aux Block(private) 89.74 77.72 77.5 90.0
Mini-Imagenet NA 87.8 4.6 0.0 -
Adversarial Training 72.9 68.5 75.2 -
Aux Block(all) 86.7 67.9 84.9 -
Aux Block(private) 85.2 71.6 86.0 -
TABLE III
OVERVIEW OF TRAINING PARAMETERS: THE MNIST CONVERGES AFTER
ABOUT 20 EPOCHS; THE CIFAR10 AND MINI-IMAGENET USES
PARAMETER DECAY AND MULTI-STEP SCHEDULER TO ENSURE MODEL
CONVERGENCE.
Parameter MNIST CIFAR10 Mini-Imagenet
Learning Rate 0.01 0.01 0.01
Momentum 0.5 0.9 0.9
Decay Delay 0 0.0005 0.0005
Batch Size 128 128 32
Epochs 20 100 100
Multi-step Scheduler - 0.1 (50 epochs) 0.1 (50 epochs)
We use a two-iteration PGD to craft adversarial examples
from the public model and observe each Aux Block’s accuracy
to investigate whether the position of an Aux Block will
influence its robustness. The result in Table VI proposes that
Block2 and Block3 have a same performance compared to
TABLE IV
AUX BLOCK
Layer Parameters
Convolution + BatchNorm + ReLU 7 × 7 × 96,
stride=2
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 192
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 384
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 512
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 10
the original result, while Block1 improves robustness to some
extent. Therefore, we propose that deep layers are not a wise
election for an Aux Block.
TABLE V
THE STRUCTURE OF BLOCK2,BLOCK3.
Layer Parameters
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 384
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 512
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 10
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 10
TABLE VI
THE ACCURACY OF THREE DIFFERENT BLOCK IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS,
BLOCK1 HAS A HIGHEST RATE.
private public
Block1 Block2 Block3 VGG16
PGD Attack 60.96 53.58 53.92 53.99
The second question: What is the number of Aux Blocks?
If we create a large number of Aux Blocks, it is inescapable
to select feature maps in deep layers as inputs, which will not
increase the robustness of our model but aggravate the weight
of incorrect output for a score-based Aux Block model and
make the model become too complicated. In our experiments,
we choose the first three layers to add Aux Blocks.
The third question: What structure is suitable for an Aux Block?
A rough Aux Block will decrease the model accuracy of
clean data, while the model will look overstaffed if an Aux
Block is too meticulous. In this paper, we design three Aux
Blocks as Aux1,Aux2,Aux3 for three datasets.
For MNIST, we use the model in Table:VIII and an Aux
Bolck model in Table IX. For CIFAR10, the Aux Block
structure is in Table X. For Mini-Imagenet, the structure is
in Table XI.
C. Static Adversary Results
We show our method improves the test accuracy of adver-
sarial examples in the static adversary. We randomly select
1000 samples for the boundary attack in the testing set and do
not use this algorithm in Mini-Imagenet due to the shortage
of computation.
In Table II, our model outputs two values: one is the
result from the whole system and the other is only from Aux
Blocks as private results. Compared to adversarial training,
Aux Block(private) has a better or equivalent performance,
which illustrates that adversarial examples from the original
non-defense model can be resisted by the Aux Block model.
Particularly, our method’s performance is better than adversar-
ial training against Carlini and Wagner’s attack on all datasets
D. Adaptive Adversary Results
Compared with the static adversary, an adaptive adversary
is a more challenging circumstance to defense. The attacker
bypasses the original no-defense model and crafts specific
examples from defense models straightforward.
1) Results: Table VII shows the accuracy on the Adp-PGD
attacks. In this table, our model outperforms the adversarial
training model remarkably 56.55% and 54.6% on Mnist and
Cifar10 dataset, while adversarial training models only have
about 20% accuracy.
Fig. 4 also shows Aux Block model helps to improve the
accuracy of adversarial examples. For small perturbation, even
if the attacker know how to craft adversarial examples for
our Aux Block model, it is still able to improve robustness
compared to adversarial training models. However, as observed
in the experiments, if the perturbation is large enough, our Aux
Block model will also be collapsed.
Although the experiment concerns with un-targeted attacks,
it does not mean targeted attacks are not covered. As we know,
targeted attacks are harder to attack and easier to defense.
Fig. 5. Left: In the MNIST dataset, the ratio of the average value lavg to
the loss value li from the Adp-FGSM perturbation with a random initial. A
small ratio value represents the average loss value is less than the targeted
loss. Right: A figure in the CIFAR10 dataset.
2) Interpretation: An adversarial example should fool most
of Aux Blocks to mislead our method. We assume an attack
for one Block is not sufficient to fool other Blocks and crafting
an example to fool all Blocks together is more difficult than
TABLE VII
THE ACCURACY IN AN ADAPTIVE ADVERSARY, WITH ADP-PGD ATTACKS
MNIST CIFAR10 Mini-Imagenet
NA 21.30 6.95 6.24
Adversarial Training 22.10 22.05 25.5
Aux Block 56.55 54.6 38.7
fooling one. Therefore, our model is less likely to be collapsed
than non-defense one.
To prove an attack for one Block is not sufficient to fool
other Blocks, we investigate the loss value in our Aux Block
model. We craft the specific perturbation targeted to one Aux
Block, and then observe the loss value of this adversarial
example in the selected classifier and also the average value in
others. For example, the adversarial example xadv = x + σi,
where σi is the perturbation for Aux Block i. Therefore, the
first loss value is li = l (fi(xadv), y) and the second value is
lavg =
1
m
∑m+1
k=1,k 6=i l (fk (xadv) , y).
Other auxiliary classifiers are not sensitive to the perturba-
tion from the targeted classifier in Fig. 5, since the ratio is less
than 1 especially when the perturbation is not very large. One
severe attack for an Aux Block has only slight influence to
other Aux Blocks. We can see that random value do not effect
the ratio. Moreover, it is obvious that crafting an example
to fool all Blocks together is more difficult than fooling one.
Therefore our method is still robust in the presence of adaptive
white-box adversaries.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
TABLE VIII
MNIST MODEL
Layer Parameters
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 6
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + ReLU 5× 5× 16
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 120
Fully Connected 10
TABLE IX
AUX BLOCK IN MNIST MODEL
Layer Parameters
Fully Connected 200
Fully Connected 10
In this paper, we propose a new defense technique called the
Aux Block model to improve the robustness of neural networks
against adversarial perturbations. We show that our algo-
rithm is a self-ensemble model and the experimental results
demonstrates that our model is robust in both two adversaries
and reports significantly improved empirical results in real
applications. Hence, our work lays out a new framework for
adversarial machine learning.
We suggest two lines of work for future study of the model.
On one hand, more applications are expected other than the
image classification applications that has been investigated in
this paper. On the other hand, a theoretical analysis of the
method is necessary to better understand the application scopes
of the proposed model.
TABLE X
AUX BLOCK IN CIFAR10
Layer Parameters
Convolution + BatchNorm + ReLU 9× 9× 64 (stride=4)
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 256
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 256
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 200
Fully Connected 10
TABLE XI
AUX BLOCK IN MINI-IMAGENET
Layer Parameters
Convolution + BatchNorm + ReLU 9× 9× 64 (stride=4)
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 256 (stride=2)
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 256
MaxPool 2× 2
Convolution + BatchNorm +ReLU 3× 3× 512
MaxPool 2× 2
Fully Connected 512
Fully Connected 10
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